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PRIDE AND PERJURY: TIME AND THE OATH IN THE MOUNTAIN VILLAGES OF CRETE

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Strategic manipulations of notions of trust and eternal value invoke a timeless model of perfect reciprocity. This 'structural nostalgia' legitimises present actions. The principle is illustrated by the uses of oaths among Cretan animal-thieves. Once an oath has been taken, accusers may not voice their suspicions of others' perjury in the absence of irrefutable evidence. The word of honour is a refraction of the divine Word, so that unfounded challenges offend at both the social and the cosmological levels. The oath is used to establish parity amongst rivals, by restoring social relations to an approximate version of the ideal. Its adoption by courts of law decreases its reliability and moral power by further undermining the principles of direct social reciprocity.

Introduction: reciprocity as nostalgia and practice

The static image of an unspoiled and irrecoverable past often plays an important part in present actions. It legitimises deeds of the moment by investing them with the moral authority of eternal truth and by representing the vagaries of circumstance as realisations of a larger universe of system and balance. I use the phrase 'structural nostalgia' to mean this collective representation of an Edenic order—a time before time—in which the balanced perfection of social relations has not yet suffered the decay that affects everything human. In rightly rejecting the timeless perfections of structuralism, some anthropologists (e.g. Bourdieu 1977; see Ortner 1984) have been too inclined to overlook how very similar are the models entertained and used by social actors in many societies, their own included.¹ People themselves ignore human agency when it suits them to do so. Thus, the failure of orthodox structuralism is not merely that it posits the existence of timeless structures existing in a social vacuum (Bourdieu 1977: 82), but also that it overlooks the ways in which social actors invent, refashion and exploit such structures as moral alibis for their contingent actions.

Take a generic case, drawn from the ethnographic context we shall be considering here. A Cretan shepherd, suspecting that a rival has stolen his animals, hales the suspect before a miraculous icon at the dead of night and makes him attest his innocence on oath. Only the intervention of the saint can guarantee the good faith that once bound all shepherds together. When it interrupts the pattern of raid and counter-raid, ideally a contest between moral equals, the oath momentarily appears to reconstitute the fractured perfection of reciprocity. In today's fallen condition, the denial that one is playing a game is part of the game itself. Structural nostalgia thus gives a spiritual basis to a literally temporal advantage.

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It also disguises the strategic manipulation of present time. Bourdieu (1977: 4–7) argues that such manipulation is central to the accumulation of symbolic capital. An animal-thief's victim, for example, does not retaliate at once, because the tension that delay can create increases the force of the eventual riposte. When a boy began raiding an older and quite powerful shepherd because the latter had not thought to offer him a cigarette, he did so in such gradual increments that, when the truth finally came out, the combination of self-restraint and cunning gave him a status made all the greater by his youth (see Herzfeld 1985: 171–3). Time, whether in the form of age differences or as the imbalance created by an unavenged slight, brings inequality. The struggle for personal dignity is an attempt to redress the balance, to achieve temporal equivalence, and thus also to recreate from one's own perspective some small part of the just and perfect order beyond time. This structural parity, however, can only ever be achieved from a particular agent's point of view. The evocation of structural nostalgia is a moral ploy. It is as much a strategy as the trickery that it is usual to condemn in one's foes.

In the cycle of Cretan animal-theft, there is one particular device that can arrest the seemingly endless temporal flow of feud,² and thereby restore a sense of balance. This is the oath of innocence, sworn between the rivals in a usually remote and deserted chapel. By recalling actors to a sense of moral duty and mutual respect, it brings structural nostalgia to the service of mutual trust in a society where otherwise irreversible suspicion would prevail. For the suspension of that endemic distrust means suppressing the slights that have accumulated through time, and doing it in a way that allows the actors to retain their pride intact. In effect, actors use religious means to restore a nominally ideal state of peace. To the extent that this works, it represents a vindication of the moral order. Conversely, when it fails, it confirms the flawed condition of all humanity (Campbell 1964: 354; Herzfeld 1987: 28–32, 46). These are the cosmological aspects. In practical terms, its success gives the actors a breathing-space, while its failure can be used by each side to claim moral advantage over the other. Cosmology is not incompatible with even those aspects of social practice that appear to violate it.

In the absence of centralised institutions, actors look for a more abstract source of moral authority to justify halting a dispute or suing for peace. Indeed, as I shall argue below, the encroachment of centralised institutions on local self-management—which has certainly happened in Crete—may actually weaken such values. This weakening occurs in part because courts and their officers deliberately remove the ultimate responsibility from the immediate actors, and because the actors have little faith in the bureaucrats' ability to conjure up divine wrath in their support.³ Structural nostalgia may take the form of longing for a time when trust did not require the intervention of bureaucratic law. By setting a standard of mutual trust that experience shows to be unattainable in the bureaucracy-ridden present, it becomes the enabling condition for tricks, lapses and excuses, but also for attempts to restore harmony even provisionally. Indeed, all such attempts must in the nature of things be provisional. While total trust is socially impossible, its temporary evocation may be strategically useful and socially desirable. Its breakdown can be blamed on the bureaucratic state, or on the even vaguer bogey of modern chaos. Actors maintain their social standing, not only by defying each other, but also—perhaps especially—by standing up to these looming larger entities. Their moral entitlement to structural nostalgia lies in their defiance of the official order.

Modern highland western and central Crete, with its long-standing tradition of reciprocal animal-theft embedded in a morality of vengeance and reciprocal hospitality, provides an excellent illustration of these issues. The Cretan highlanders take great pride in their resistance to bureaucratic officers and express contempt for the equally bureaucratic functionaries of the church. Their ethical rhetoric despoils the official discourse of clerks and priests and turns it against them, most dramatically in the illegal and ecclesiastically disapproved but socially endemic practice of reciprocal animal-theft.

By exploring the continually re-negotiated reconciliation between the structures of religious orthodoxy and the practices entailed in reciprocal theft, I wish to suggest ways of moving beyond the conventional dualities of theology and folk religion, or religiosity and instrumentality, or indeed structure and practice. I suggest that some versions of structure are best seen *as* practice, or, more specifically, as rhetorical devices that social actors use to good effect. In this framework, the use of religious paraphernalia in the resolution of theft-related disputes belongs to actors' strategic explorations of the tension between ideal order and daily experience. I propose to illustrate this tension with what the shepherds told me about specific confrontations. Their accounts illustrate the ways in which Cretan shepherds themselves interpret and negotiate the paradoxes of a contested moral universe.

Swearing innocence: supernatural sanctions

By 'stealing to befriend', Cretan shepherds actively seek the admiration of potential allies through a series of reciprocal livestock raids that ideally culminate in ties of spiritual kinship between the principals.⁴ Severely repressed by the dictator Metaxas (1936-40) and the military junta of 1967-74, animal-theft—which traditionally flourished during times of war and foreign occupation—also tends to burgeon in more democratic times, as politicians offer patronage (and especially protection from the law) to tough, powerful shepherds who control large agnatic voting blocs. The least effective thieves have generally found themselves excluded very rapidly from the game, and have usually switched to agriculture—a despised occupation that debars them from further attempts at raiding, since they no longer own livestock for their victims to steal in reprisal. A more recent pattern of commercial, non-reciprocal raiding today allows the older shepherds, as they complain about the decline of thieves' morality (sometimes even at police-sponsored meetings), to forget that their own raiding was not always reciprocal and that they, too, did not readily spare the weak. The view of the past that they now counterpose to the selfish, brutal present bears the classic marks of structural nostalgia: social balance, reciprocity, moral parity, observance of self-enforcing rules.

The ideal Cretan animal-thief, when challenged, admits to his deeds. Being heroic (*andras*, 'a man') means taking full responsibility for one's own actions, and this converges with the desire for recognition as a current foe and prospective ally who is 'to be reckoned with' (*ipoloyisimos*). Like the reciprocal hostility between non-kin that may become the guarded cordiality of affines (see Campbell 1964: 50), animal-theft looks forward to the possibility of conversion into the positive reciprocities of alliance, whether through spiritual kinship or other ties. Conversely, raids on kin, spiritual kin, or co-villagers evoke charges of 'pollution' (*oghoursouza*⁵) that recall the parallel of incest. A suspect may refuse to admit to a particular deed, especially on those comparatively rare occasions when he finds himself confronted by the victim himself rather than by the latter's emissary.⁶ The victim may at that point demand that the suspect

'take an oath', usually in a remote church in the dead of night and on pain of supernatural sanctions for perjury. These sanctions are often violent, and are credited with impressively selective accuracy. Keramia villagers tell of two sheep-thieves, one of whom refused to swear a false oath and lived to be ninety, while the other, who 'was afraid' of his accuser, took a false oath—and died immediately thereafter (for place-names, see fig. 1).



FIGURE 1. Map of Crete

The usual form of the oath intimates the terrors of divine punishment: 'As my hand moves away from [the icon of] the saint, thus may my soul separate from my body if I am at fault to you' (or 'if I know anything'). This suggests a theological metaphor: the hand, signifying the reliance of the human upon the divine, simultaneously affirms the dependence of the corporeal upon the spiritual. A man whose word proves worthless is a mere husk, a body without socially recognised spirituality. It is through the hand that a man realises that spirituality. A handshake re-establishes normal relations after either an oath or a full confession of guilt. Thus formally initiated, contact thereafter grows visibly more protracted and elaborate (e.g. fondling of the other's arm or back) as men become more at ease with each other. The hand is both the symbol and the instrument of male incorporation.

Sometimes, if these staunchly anti-clerical shepherds do not want to enter a church at all, they make the sign of the cross on a stone and use that instead of an icon; then the oath begins, 'As this cross stands out [from the stone]...' (Herzfeld 1985: 204). Both oaths may also reinforce the terror of perjury by adding: 'and [may my soul] not go to God but to the devils, if I know anything about what you ask me'. Sometimes, the oath specifies the sanctions the perjurer may expect to incur (e.g. 'may I not live out the year if...'; the secular equivalent, heard in response to police interrogation, may be: 'Even if I should be shot, I am not to blame for the animals'). The form 'I am at fault to you' (*sou fieo*), moreover, recasts the social dimension as a relationship of accountability between two particular individuals—a form of reciprocity, damaged but now undergoing repair, that reproduces the general premiss of ultimate social interdependence in an immediate context of competitive male behaviour and values. Shepherds may also add the formal court promise to tell 'the truth and nothing but the truth'.

Some saints seem more commonly invoked, though none has an exclusive status. At Miriokefala, shepherds used to promise the Panayia (Virgin Mary) a quarter of a stolen animal if they were successful on a raid. The equestrian St George—prototype

of the idealised youth (*pallikari*) amongst the shepherds (see Campbell 1964: 278–9; Machin 1983)—is the patron saint of three of the major churches where oaths are taken by suspected thieves (Diskouri, Dramia and Selinaris). In one mainly agricultural village near the south coast, I was told that the locals prefer the remoter church of St John the Divine to the church of St George, which is located right inside the village: distance and secrecy, as we shall see, are practical virtues. Other churches where the ritual is often conducted are dedicated to the Holy Cross, to St Fanourios, and to St Nicholas.

But the key distinctions appear to lie less between specific saints than between the local *refractions*—in Evans-Pritchard’s (1956: 196) sense—of a particular saint’s grace (*khan*).⁷ To a sceptic from Glendi who insisted that there was only one St George, an ex-shepherd replied, ‘One [St George] is a miracle-worker, the next a sinner!’ While such segmentary refraction of holy figures may be doctrinally unacceptable, it appears prominently in daily acts of veneration as well as in blasphemous utterances (Herzfeld 1987: 166), and gives concrete expression to both conflict and alliance. A shepherd who seeks to repair or create an alliance must invoke saintly grace at a level where it will be *socially inclusive* enough to incorporate both his own and his adversary’s loyalties. Geographical distance and the icon’s reputation for miracles together decide the choice of church. This is the pattern whereby, throughout Greece, a local shrine may eventually become the focus of even national sentiment (see Dubisch 1988: 122).

Distance lends enchantment

Geographical distance reflects both the need for secrecy and the view that more remote locations may be more effective sources of supernatural reinforcement against perjury. Oath-taking occurs by preference at night, and only rarely in central village churches. Even though the suspect almost always protests his innocence, the very fact that he has been called to account in this way may affect his reputation. Some villagers say that using a church that one might enter every day undermines the solemnity—and therefore the efficacy—of the ritual; one man jested that the saint of one’s own church would know too much already! Moreover, the sight of two shepherds—in general a cynically anti-clerical group of men—heading determinedly for a church door admits of only one likely explanation: ‘What else would they go to a church for?’ At the mountain monastery of St George at Diskouri, near Glendi, so deep is the perceived need for discretion, and so familiar is the abbot with all the local shepherds, that the principals will often send a third party to get the church key from the abbot in order to avoid recognition. Secrecy operates in favour of the chapels of comparatively remote monasteries, as against more accessible village churches. The monks’ presence also intensifies the sense of sanctity; the monks themselves, many of whom come from shepherding families and are not as prone as village priests to betray the secrets of the confessional, understand the need for discretion. At least in theory, however, any church may serve. There may be good reasons for seizing the first available opportunity. The use of a simple stone for oath-taking, which removes the action from priestly prying altogether, also gives the suspect little time to recant or to summon kin who might discourage him from taking the oath at all.

The distance shepherds are prepared to go for the ritual is an index of the gravity of the particular theft and the intensity of feeling it has provoked. Thus, the evocation of religious sentiment simultaneously appeals to practicality: faced with an arduous

journey, and with the outcome all the more certainly against him, a guilty party is more likely to confess right away. On the other hand, there is clearly not much point in taking a suspect far from home unless continuing suspicion threatens a wider network of social relationships, especially within the village community. When the principals are from different villages, the oath is often the last available recourse.

There is one general exception to the preference for distance and remoteness. Some monastery shepherds, although enjoying the status of monks themselves, seem not to have been above the occasional minor raid in the past, and might often be called upon to take an oath of innocence. They were particularly careful not to commit perjury, probably because they were more constrained than ordinary shepherds to show respect for saintly retribution; moreover, they could be forced to swear on the icon of their own monastery, where specific perjuries would compound the sacrilege against the offender's original monastic vows. These shepherd-monks (*kouradhokonomi*) could not indulge in large-scale counter-raiding without becoming an embarrassment to the church. They did have recourse to other means of creating social ties, particularly as dispensers of monastic hospitality, as kin to many ordinary shepherds and through the creation of spiritual kinship ties with others. They also had no need of perjury, as their occasional thefts could only have been intended as warnings rather than as starting large-scale cycles of reciprocal theft.

Supernatural sanctions and social relations

The most commonly attributed supernatural consequences of perjury include: injury to a limb, sudden paralysis making it impossible to leave (or enter) the church, loss of sight or of an eye, and the destruction of one's family. Commenting on a case involving this last sanction, a sceptic insisted that it was not the action of 'the saint' (actually the Holy Cross): 'It just so happened that he got wounded! And the whole district became terrified that whoever "ate" monastery animals would suffer injury—and especially if he took a false oath and didn't own up'. That was supposedly the end of raids against the monastery: thus, even if one accepts the sceptic's interpretation, *social* effects flow from the attribution of supernatural sanctions. The consequences of perjury, observed one villager, are inexorable, 'even if you have God as your father'.

The icons with the greatest reputation for miracle-working, punitive or other, mostly belong to independent monasteries rather than to local chapels. Monastery churches, being on their own territory, are neutral in relation to inter-village disputes; they also provide a neutral context for resolving strife between co-villagers or kin (cf. also Brown 1971: 83–94). The Glendiots' preferred locations for oath-taking rituals are the Diskouri chapel, which is close to their own village, and the roadside chapel of St George at Selinaris near Agios Nikolaos. The first of these is relatively accessible, but stands in its own land and controls the water supply to Glendi and two other villages. The sanctions that this St George produces can appear more embarrassing than punitive. A perjurer is said to find the saint's icon leaning away from his hand as he swears. This may be a play on the oath itself ('as my hand moves away...'), and specifically on its evocation of death (the separation of soul from body). The rejection of the hand embodies and enacts the saint's rejection of the perjurer's soul. But the saint does not subsequently appear in person to exact his revenge. In the 1930s, local thieves would go to Diskouri at the command of the police to swear never to steal again. They soon discovered that the saint did not punish them when they broke this

solemn oath, apparently because bureaucratic duress invalidated it. The state has rarely resorted to this method of prevention since that time. The geographically much more distant St George of Selinaris, by contrast, is credited with ferocious reprisals against perjurers: one ‘goes in and trembles’. Also, if one passes by without stopping to pray in the church, a fatal accident is likely to follow swiftly. For this reason, it is an appropriate locale for the resolution of particularly serious conflicts; when, for example, an ex-mayor of Glendi was accused of writing libellous letters about some of the women in the village in order to discredit his political foes, he affirmed his innocence on oath at Selinaris, and the accusations rapidly died away.

By emphasising physical distance from their home villages, the principals avoid the fragmentation of daily social life and revert instead to a total spiritual fact with its social analogue in their encompassing Christianity.⁸ Religious ‘faith’ (*pisti*) brooks no questioning: ‘believe and do not inquire (*pisteve ke min erevna*)’. The shepherds realise this same principle socially, through the ‘trustworthiness’ (*embistosini*) that makes any further doubting of motives socially unacceptable and morally indefensible. *Embistosini* encompasses the duality of religious and social values. When an accuser says of a local church, ‘I don’t have *embistosini* in the Panayia, let’s go to Diskouri’, he does not spurn the Virgin Mary as a hagiographical entity, but rather expresses his faith in oaths sworn at a *place* already credited with miraculous powers.

A case of ‘betrayal’ illustrates the conceptual articulation of oath-taking with social relations. A thief was arrested; the victim was locally suspected of having reported him to the authorities—an act that could have led to a full-scale cycle of vengeance killings. At the first trial, in the prefecture capital of Rethimno, the thief was convicted and sentenced. He appealed, and the case went to appeal in more distant Khania. Note that, as with the oath-taking ritual, geographical span increases with the seriousness of the situation. Mutual friends of thief and victim meanwhile increased pressure on the victim to withdraw his testimony. ‘Fear’ of this pressure became fiercer than fear of perjury, and, at the appeal trial, the accuser retracted the charges, saying that the thief’s repeated protestations of innocence led him to propose a trial by oath at Selinaris, and that the accused’s ready acquiescence must be taken as proof of his innocence. ‘For I believe that he did not “eat” them from me.⁹ And I made a mistake. And I ask the court’s forgiveness’. Distance lent authority to holy shrine and appeal court alike, and the case for the prosecution was dismissed. Although the accused was in fact guilty, no judge would challenge even the reported voice of that higher and more distant judge, the miracle-working icon. Selinaris is the ‘Supreme Court’ (*Arios Paghos*¹⁰).

Physical distance and the terrors it evokes, human and divine, do not necessarily mean that shepherds *believe* each other in such situations. Their actions appear to be dictated mainly by social concerns. The question of belief, both in the validity of the oath taken and in the supernatural sanctions that supposedly befall perjurers, is in any case beyond analysis.¹¹ Others’ motives are ultimately both impenetrable, as villagers themselves insist (see also du Boulay 1974: 84), and automatically suspect. The practice of resolution by oath permits a face-saving avoidance of further conflict in the name of higher truths, but this implies precisely the opposite of ingenuous trust: it furnishes a ritualised means of letting a rival escape further retribution without necessarily changing one’s mind about his guilt. The invitation to take the oath comes invested with a guarantee that the matter will end there. The very sanctity of the process is what protects the lie that it may—and, in the general estimation, often does—conceal.

Reluctant accusers: risks of the oath

The oath-taking ritual is called *ksekatharisi* ('clearing up'), a term directly reminiscent of the 'clean oath' (*katharos orkos*) of the innocent man, of being 'clean' in the sense of being innocent and therefore willing to take the oath, and of having been 'cleansed/cleared' (*ksekatharismenos*) of suspicion (by taking the oath) or of the ongoing burden of guilt (by owning up). This set of terms, clearly opposed to 'pollution', and especially to being 'soiled' (*magharismenos*) by perjury, conflates the establishment of truth with the restoration of social relations. For today, in contrast to the idealised past, perjury is far from rare: 'now', it is said 'we have become polluted'. But if a man takes the oath, he has ritually constituted his own innocence, and can no longer be challenged without offence to his person and to the social body.

Since lying is commonly expected of animal-thieves, their victims—thieves themselves—place little confidence in their oaths. Reciprocally, the suspect may put his accuser off with an excuse, procrastinate, or even refuse point-blank. Once he has agreed to take the oath, however, he has accepted full responsibility before the saint and before God. Despite the terrifying stories of supernatural punishment, perjury is precisely what many people expect of the guilty. Contrary to Austin's (1975: 42–3, 154) account of judicial decisions, in which the verdict socially constitutes innocence or guilt and may be challenged if it is unconvincing, oath-taking establishes a conventional truce in which further investigation is henceforward proscribed: 'I [the victim] am obliged, I must never mention it again'. At the end of the ritual, an accuser may say to the suspect, '*Khalali sou*'—an expression, meaning 'I don't begrudge you it', that surrenders all rights to the stolen animal or object. This is hardly a reassurance that he really accepts the suspect's innocence. A former monk remarked that once a shepherd has sworn his innocence 'he is considered "cleansed"—not completely, of course, but, well... ' Such temporising speaks for itself. In the wicked present world, the very expression 'to take an oath' (*na paris orko*) can and commonly does mean 'to perjure yourself'. Wickedness is the rule, not the exception.

Except as a last resort, the oath is thus a bad risk for the shepherd whose animals have disappeared. For the perjurer, moreover, there are numerous ways of squaring deceit with conscience. To say that one has not 'eaten' another's sheep, for example, is ambiguous (see f.n.9). One Milopotamos shepherd asserted on oath that he had not—and he had not, in a literal sense—ingested the stolen animals. His accuser, however, understood him to be wholly uninvolved in the theft, which he was not. Such niceties avoid any necessity for actual perjury. Even if the truth comes out, the victim may not exact revenge. Mere evidence cannot gainsay an oath's holy authority, and it is both blasphemous and a heinous solecism to suggest that it might.

The shepherds' reluctance to place suspects on oath also stems from the theological implication of the challenger in the perjurer's sin. This is explicit: 'you take on responsibility' (*pernis e/thini*) for having forced the suspect to such a pass. Harming any being, however evil, imposes a burden of sin. Even those who exorcise demons or banish the evil eye must shoulder that burden. If the suspect is in fact innocent, the accuser carries a more direct sin (*amartia*), and is significantly more 'guilty' (*enokhos*) himself, both socially and theologically. The responsibility that attaches to unfounded charges is dramatically symbolised in the tale of a man mistakenly accused of arson. Forced against his will to take an oath at the reputedly miraculous church of St Nicholas at Keramia, he called on the saint to exercise poetic justice: 'If I'm *not* at fault to you,

he [the saint] will show the miracle on *your* head'. This literally came to pass: within three months, his accuser died of a cerebral haemorrhage. Once again, theological exegesis parallels social exigency. A guilty person, when pressed to take the oath, usually prefers to return the animals because, as a former policeman explained in unwitting evocation of Mauss's (1968: 160) *lien d'âmes*, 'these people have close ties amongst themselves'.

Suspicion, like animal-theft itself, is reciprocal, and a challenger may not refuse to take an oath in his turn. This is the social corollary of the theological reciprocity just noted, according to which those who accuse wrongly—even if from error rather than malice—may be punished by the saints or their own consciences. The accuser has committed himself to a reciprocal agreement the intention of which is to restore goodwill. He therefore cannot escape the implications of reciprocity in the administration of the oath. The accused may, for example, demand that his accuser swear in return that the missing animals *are* actually missing. Then again, if the accuser has himself started a cycle of theft against the accused, it would be logical for him to assume that this latest theft was in revenge. In that case, the roles are reversed and the current suspect demands that his challenger swear innocence in turn. Reciprocity is thematic: if the suspect is charged with some other offence, such as having reported the accuser to the police, the counter-charge should be of an analogous kind.

Above all, a challenger may not openly doubt the oath once it has been taken. To do so is not only a denial of common humanity (being *anthropos*), the nexus that explains the need for trust in the first place. It is also 'unmanly'. This makes sense in terms of the commonly held view that manliness is a matter of courage and self-control. It takes strong nerves not to keep checking on a potential enemy. Amongst the toughest shepherds, forbearance can be a sign of strength. Eternal faith (*pisti*) in the divine order provides the prototype for the necessarily more transient condition (cf. Hart 1988: 187) of 'being persuaded' (*pistemenos*¹²) that restores social harmony.

The practical risks of using the oath are considerable. It is clear that the rhetoric of trust does not preclude trickery. On the contrary, it nurtures it. At the same time, shepherds recognise that they are participants in a common social environment, and this imposes limits on their willingness to condemn one another to permanent social exclusion. It may be more useful to prevent a rival from committing perjury because the latter is a strong and powerful shepherd with good connexions, or because the victim is more interested in keeping the raiding cycle alive. An example will illustrate these limits.

A pair of shepherds, having agreed with a thief to give up all claims on a stolen animal in exchange for the return of the bell,¹³ and having consummated the agreement by establishing a relationship of spiritual kinship, then sneaked off to the thief's partner and tricked him—unbeknownst to the first thief—into agreeing to take an oath of innocence. At the last moment, however, the older accuser and a kinsman who had hidden himself in the priest's sanctum came forward with the bell. The thief had no choice but to confess. In this way, they stopped him from committing perjury—though this was expressed as a practical and social concern that the suspect should not implicate himself by becoming branded a perjurer—and at the same time scared him into giving them an animal to replace the stolen one after all. Behind this crafty trick lies not only practical advantage but also a concern to avoid implicating in perjury a rival who might some day become a useful ally. Its special brilliance lies in exacting compensation

without actually committing the solecism of asking for it.

Shepherds are careful to avoid knowingly letting their rivals commit perjury, and are thus reluctant to use the oath. One South Cretan shepherd adamantly refuses ever to do so. He argues that it would be wrong to risk luring another shepherd into the sin of perjury over anything so trivial as a stolen goat. The only time he did use the device was when he was serving as a member of one of the state-supported local shepherds' committees set up in the late 1970s to combat animal-theft. In this case, he was not acting solely on his own behalf. Admittedly, any form of co-operation with the authorities carried overtones of 'betrayal' (*prodhosia*). By helping to narrow the field of suspects, however, he could plausibly claim to be protecting the interests of the community as a whole, while his use of a dramatically 'traditional' device protected him from charges of 'betraying' the culprit. Like the casting of lots in inheritance, it removed responsibility from the agent to an impersonal, cosmological authority, and the accused thief made an independent decision to confess rather than risk divine wrath or eventual exposure as an anti-social perjurer.

A shepherd must always remember that if his use of the oath causes a rival to lie, he himself may lose social worth. He may not challenge a declaration of innocence made under oath. Thus, he has cut himself off from any right to retaliate. If it should later emerge that the suspect was in fact the thief, the challenger—who has allowed himself to be cheated out of his just vengeance—may be as humiliated as much as the perjurer. At that point, his only reasonably sure means of regaining some degree of respect is through dramatic vengeance such as the destruction of the perjurer's entire flock.

The oath brings accuser and suspect face-to-face, with the attendant risk of violence, rather than permitting the indirect negotiation through third parties that is the normative and preferred mode of operation. Even when shepherds are able to claim more or less plausibly that they have stolen by mistake—that is, from their own allies—and decide to make amends, they prefer to leave the animals in a neutral place where their owner will find them, rather than taking them back in person and risking a violent confrontation. One's closest friend can be suspect until proved innocent, and shepherds openly doubt that allies would avoid raiding them if they could get away with it. It is the rhetoric of 'error' that usually allows allies to gloss over a botched attempt by one side on the other's flocks. The only alternative is extreme moral outrage and its attendant mayhem.

A successful administration of the oath should, by contrast, *defuse* violence. Guilty parties generally prefer to approach the brink of taking the oath instead of either confessing or refusing outright. The gradual yielding that this permits improves the chances of a peaceful resolution. If a suspect refuses to submit to the test of the oath, he provokes doubts, not only about his innocence, but also, more importantly, about his manhood. In so doing, he forfeits the respect on which worthwhile alliances are based.

Only if the challenger has acted inappropriately may the suspect legitimately decline. Then, the demonstrated immorality (*dropi*) of the challenger may work to the suspect's advantage. The latter may then *want* the former to go on suspecting him erroneously, without being able to arrive at a satisfactory resolution of his uncertainty. Conversely, when a challenger looks like a potentially worthy ally, owning up—even falsely—may seem to offer more advantages than taking an oath of innocence. False confessions,

however, constitute as spurious a claim to manhood as perjury. It is best to tell the truth, for then the moral burden of response falls on the challenger.

The practical principles of the oath of innocence are internally consistent. A shepherd will only administer the oath to a rival whose personal courage he has some expectation of respecting. A cowardly rival is of no interest. First of all, he will be of no use as a future ally. Then again, if he is afraid of telling the truth, his perjury works to the discredit of *both* parties, as it may raise embarrassing questions about the accuser's judgement as much as it does about the culprit's social worth. Finally, perjury has no obvious effects as long as it remains undiscovered. A shepherd who suspects that his rival has taken a false oath can do nothing about it without, once again, raising awkward questions about his own initial judgement. Since he has accepted the rival as a virtual equal, the latter's perjury would imply that he has exercised poor judgement and that, in so doing, he has participated in a truly appalling sin.

From the Word of God to the word of honour

Nonetheless, narratives about actual cases of perjury are far from infrequent. To understand the apparent paradox, we must first abandon the assumption that the values entailed in reciprocal animal-theft are necessarily at odds with Christian morality. For the shepherds, the theological and the social belong to different but closely interwoven orders of truth. The social order represents a refraction of the divine through the divisive complexities of everyday experience. Social life is riddled with secrecy and deception, so that apparent revelations may be disproved by subsequent evidence. Social life lacks the revealed quality of eternal truth; knowledge is contingent upon the flow of time.

People understand the workings of the divine order, however, through its particular appearances in daily experience. Thus, divine retribution for perjury parallels the logic of vengeance against those who violate the canons of reciprocal theft. Similarly, the idea that a man who exacts a false oath from another carries an equal share of the burden of sin parallels the social humiliation he suffers when his gullibility comes into the open. Shepherds also see perjury as analogous to the betrayal of co-villagers to the authorities, and—especially significantly—to the rape of women from one's own village. All these acts are violations of 'boundaries' (*oria*), and as such are also, as we have already seen, forms of symbolic 'pollution' (*oghoursouza*). Sin, whether theological or social, violates the boundary between 'one's own' and others: 'Whatever the "job" is, whether it's called "theft" or "atimia",¹⁴ when it's in your own neighbourhood it isn't right and you shouldn't do it'. Rape in the home community, for example, like animal-theft and violence, is socially concentric with incest but at a more inclusive level, and allows the rapist no defenders.¹⁵

Thus, a 'clean oath' springs from faith in the Word of God. Concomitantly, 'cleaning up' the social relationship requires faith in one's opponent's 'word'. The social both reflects and refracts the theological, so that to accuse a man of lying under oath is at one and the same time to say that he has been a poor specimen of manhood and to denounce him as a sinner and as lacking *theofovia*, 'fear of God'. This implies not only that he has perpetuated the injury to the victim (who might have little claim on other shepherds' sympathy in any case), but also that he is beyond the human pale itself. Lack of the fear of God characterises animals in contrast to humans, Turks in contrast to Greeks. By initiating the procedure of the oath, the victim challenges the suspect's

probity, but still does so in a manner that admits of recovery through the ‘manly’ act of proud admission. By then accusing the suspect of perjury, however, a victim would turn a single act of the socially accepted practice of animal-theft into a collective, irremediable, and categorical condition of simultaneously sin and solecism. This intolerable insult can only be countered with homicide—precisely the extreme of violence that the oath is ideally meant to preclude. Perjury, because it is known to happen, can be a convincing charge. It identifies an individual’s depravity with the modern condition that makes such depravity possible to begin with. But the charge mars a culprit’s reputation for personal strength. It fits a social framework in which men compete over the very possession of manhood and in which few can expect to maintain their reputations intact.

The oath provides a sanctioned means of defusing tension. In the introduction, we saw how the gradual increments of raiding by the offended boy achieved a more effective result than a single massive raid would have done. Another young Glendiot avenged himself for long past raids on his father’s flock by stealing the culprit’s lead ram—and thus the symbol of his own masculinity—as well as several ewes. When challenged, he agreed to swear on the icon of St George in the village church. He confessed to one theft, then another, then yet another, all the time working his way up to the most serious confession of all: the theft of the ram. Through his strategic timing of the discussion, the Glendiot gradually lured the other into a situation where he could accuse him directly and with impunity of having ruined his father. His adversary had long assumed that his own theft had gone undetected, and had hoped to neutralise the Glendiot by making him either swear or confess. He now had to accept reinterpretation of the Glendiot’s theft of the ram—which would have been considered a disgusting act under ordinary circumstances¹⁶ as a just reciprocation.

The immediate circumstances favoured resolution. Because the entire exchange took place late at night and in secrecy, there was no external pressure to continue the feud, and the game ended in a tie. Only the priest, having been asked for the key to the church by the thoroughly profane Glendiot, must have suspected something (and was in fact free to ask what was happening because he was a member of the same patrigroup as the young man). In the contest over manhood, such delicate arrangements reduce the risk of actual bloodshed: ‘We made a compromise then. He didn’t even ask for money; that is, [he had a right to do so because] the animals that I had “eaten” were more, I’d “eaten” more of his animals than he had [of mine]’. This forbearance meant that resolution was possible: ‘And we shook hands there and then, and we never, that is, “bothered” each other again’. Villagers say that the absence of pressure from third parties, or from the principals’ agnates, contributes significantly to the lessening of tension. Audiences can be dangerous in a society where public performance makes and breaks manly reputations.

In this instance, in the privacy of a night-time encounter, the principals could quietly work out an interpretation of events that allowed them to evade the dangerous logic of insult. The accused both showed his manhood through confession and justified his actions on moral grounds. By thus claiming a moral balance with his accuser, he established the right conditions for a truce. Asymmetrical relations, by contrast, are a denial of the lesser partner’s masculinity. Indeed, this logic also governs the occasional use of the oath between people of different gender. At the church of St Nicholas in Keramia, men sometimes come from other areas to put their wives’ fidelity to the test

of the oath. A woman will not delay confession to the last minute as a thief might, and she may not put her husband on oath. Male infidelity does not usually carry the same sanctions as female (see, for example, du Boulay 1974: 124). Initiating the procedure of the oath is a mark of superiority. Between shepherds, contestants in an unstable struggle, such inequality may sometimes be reversed; between spouses, whose inequality is divinely ordained, never.¹⁷

Oaths as social refractions of the Word

The oath invests social relations with theological force. Like ties of spiritual kinship, whose instrumentality in the social and political world reflects rather than contradicts human relations with the saints, it is cosmological in a literal sense. The *kosmos*, literally the 'world' but also 'people' (as in the French *tout le monde*), is what comments, gossips, backbites and quarrels, but it is also the stage on which the thieves' actions acquire meaning and force. Relations of mutual trust convert all the negative aspects into positive ones. When an innocent suspect agrees to take an oath, 'the hatred goes away' as a result: 'If I am determined not to believe him, we won't go to the church at all!'

The oath detemporalises a touchy situation: by treating the suspect's word as ritually validated truth, it recasts it in terms of Eternity, neutralising past disputes in favour of present and future harmony. It begins in confrontation, and the danger of violent breakdown increases right up to the last minute. Usually, however, a thief only just stops short of the oath itself, when he may legitimately subordinate his fear of another shepherd to the fear of God.

Bourdieu (1977: 7) writes of two different ways of managing time—manipulating the tempo of the action to increase tension, and 'strategies intended simply to neutralize the action of time and ensure the continuity of interpersonal relations'. These are not, however, mutually exclusive idioms. Here, the manipulation of tempo aims at achieving the sense of detemporalised continuity—of what we might well call eternal friendship. Strategies that express hostility through temporally marked and creatively deformed acts¹⁸ achieve, in the logic of Cretan reciprocity, a timeless 'love' (*aghapi*)—the social harmony that is both the correct relationship with God and the former condition of society (cf. Stewart 1987: 83; du Boulay 1974: 249).¹⁹ The ideal end-product of oath-taking is usually described in this kind of language, which is also the language of structural nostalgia. In short, the oath returns the participants to that edenic state when trust made a shepherd's word sufficient.

Perjury is an affront to that love, and to its accompanying sense of value (*timi*, often translated as 'honour'²⁰). It is a denial of the possibility of trust. Conversely, the informal word of honour (*loghos timis*) is the earthly refraction of the divinely ordained Logos. Indeed, shepherds regard the word of honour as the purest contractual form; it requires the least external regulation, and is thus conceptually closest to God's Word. It is embedded directly in the social relationship, without saintly or legal mediation, and this is symbolised by the handclasp which, in the oath, is replaced by the laying of the hand on the icon. In the postlapsarian world, 'I don't believe in you, in your words'. Note the plural, 'words'. Plurality is associated with evil in popular Greek cosmology (Stewart 1985b: 60), and—as in the blasphemous refraction of divine images—expresses social discord. It has therefore become necessary to appeal to a saintly guarantor—not just a generic St George or Panayia but a localised refraction credited with especially terrible or miraculous powers. The shift from a handshake to the placing of the hand

on the icon, signifying saintly mediation, literally embodies the decline of direct and universal trust. It marks a shift from ecumenical harmony to a segmentary perception of mutual dependence, and to a world in which mediators—priests, monks, and bureaucrats—have become a regrettable necessity. A shepherd boasted that no rival had ever managed to get him inside a church, that his word had always sufficed: anti-ecclesiastical sentiment here ironically converges with closeness to God. The placing of a hand on the Bible in court represents a further and final decline in the embodiment of trust: the physical images of saints, themselves a more exigent and localised replacement for the handy stone or for the word of honour, now yield to the ultimate specificity of abstract print. Amongst shepherds who despise all kinds of ‘pen-pushers’ even the Holy Writ seems a poor substitute for the direct and pervasive Word of God.

Cynicism and the state

The common claim that shepherds formerly took oaths much more seriously is an extension of these same ideas. Perjurers resemble those who steal flock animals for purely financial gain: both undercut established idioms of reciprocity. Indeed, one of the commonest forms of perjury today—the recanting of sworn testimony in court—most often serves commercial thieves. Villagers may criticise perjury of this type, but attribute it to the fallibility of the legal system and to their own reluctance to betray the perjuries of specific individuals. One illiterate old man, asked by a judge whether he knew what perjury was, is said to have replied, ‘You get justice [that way] (*to dava sou čerdhizis!*)!’

To the thieves, oaths sworn in court are less sacrosanct than those sworn on the basis of mutual trust (*pisti*). In the words of a notorious Glendiot animal-thief: ‘In a law-court, to get someone else off [a charge], they say, it [i.e. perjury] is not important.... In a church, you shouldn’t do it. In church, you’re afraid to’. **The court represents the hostile bureaucratic state, and saving a fellow-shepherd from jail is morally good: villagers identify religious priorities with social rather than legal morality. Even in lowland villages, supposedly more inclined to legality, men prefer to take an oath in church rather than go to court.** It is clear that the ideal world of reciprocal theft is closer to God’s order than are the legal institutions of the state.

Nostalgia for the past equates morality with respect for the Word: ‘in the old days, the word of honour was enough’. Even the use of icons to reinforce a simple word of honour implies relative distrust. In Glendi, a small boy once swore on a stone that he would not betray the older girl who had put him up to stealing a pig, but, when put on his word of honour, could no longer pretend ignorance; such was the hierarchy of obligations internalised by a boy of seven or eight. ‘I preferred to break the oath [rather than the word of honour]; and I still cannot break my word’. The smaller the degree of formality, the closer men come to God’s intentions. To Cretan animal-thieves, the bureaucratic nation-state—like the official church—represents the intrusion of moral corruption into society.

Personal pasts reproduce the general nostalgia. One former shepherd maintained that in his youth he had never put anyone on oath, as the culprits were always proud and ready to confess. The ferocity of his reprisals insured him against the insult of others’ lies, while his value as a potential ally made others actually want him to learn of their daring. But practical advantage, as we have seen, has theological and moral

parallels that both explain and reinforce it. The purest word of honour was that which did not even need to be specified aloud. It was closer than any modern formula to the ineffable Word. In court, at the other extreme, legalism—the bureaucrat's insistence on establishing facts by writing them down—absolved him of any moral requirement to tell the truth at all (see also Stewart n.d.: 29). Defence counsel who try to make shepherds swear falsely in court can hardly increase these supposedly lawless highlanders' respect for judicial process.

The oath, though less pure than the word of honour, may nevertheless serve to restore the link with God. In official contexts, however, people falsely 'take the oath' in court on the Gospel without fear of supernatural consequences. In court the Book, which for the state represents the unity of Deity and the Greek Orthodox people, does not have the punitive force of local refractions of particular saints. These saints are entailed in a never-ending contest between local solidarities, whose unity lies in their common recognition that the social world is in fact an irrevocably divided one. To surrender to the blandly homogeneous bureaucracy is thus to deny the contestatory fellowship of being human. It is necessary to lie in order to protect socially recognised truths (see also Gilson 1976: 208–10). In the modern bureaucratic world, blasphemous falsehood becomes the only defence left to the divine ordering of human life.

A word at the end: the ends of words

Asad's (1987) argument that Catholic monastic discipline redirected rather than repressed human emotion holds generally true for Orthodox monasticism also. The monks are *of* if not fully *in* the same world as the shepherds, whose calling provides a powerful metaphor for the role of Christ and of the church;²¹ that much is clear from their entailment in pastoral practice in both senses (as in the role of the *kouradhokonomi*). In monastic life, however, discipline triumphs over strategy, an encompassing institutional unity over individual will. The shepherds' use of ecclesiastical paraphernalia reverses all these things. The shepherds define their moral purity in *opposition* to institutionalised values, and their reciprocities are with each other rather than with centralised authority. Their pragmatic morality thus refracts the Divine Word, *Logos*, through the divisions of social life. This atomised perspective results in a multiplicity of more or less reliable words (*loyi*²²) of honour. 'In the Beginning was the Word'. Today there are merely words, serving endless ends.

I have argued elsewhere (Herzfeld 1983) that the appeal to a better, nobler past is part of the symbolic management of the present. Women were *always* chaster in the previous generation, the dowry *always* represented an unfortunate burden imposed by the importation of urban and foreign values over the previous fifty years. Eden is *always* only just out of sight. Such structural nostalgia, however, has considerable social importance. What Giddens (1984: 25–9) calls the 'duality of structure'—the reciprocal interplay of structure and agency—means that the formal ideology we recognise as structure is the very stuff that 'socialized agents' (Bourdieu & Lamaison 1985: 94) mine for strategic resources. Questions of trust, which is a distinctly orderly notion, arise in situations of continuing uncertainty (Gambetta 1988: 218). They turn on a questionable but necessary capacity for predicting and anticipating the actions of others, and thus represent attempts to control present time. The continual suspicion that marks everyday experience is corrosive, and there are moments when it is easier for all concerned to reach a truce based on mutual respect. In such situations, the actors join forces to

reclaim the eternal verities. They strive for a temporary suspension of temporality.

Thus, in rejecting a simplistic opposition between Orthodox ecclesiastical values and those of the Cretan animal-thieves (and with it the view that the thieves treat the church without any regard for theological considerations), we are instead able to translate the 'dialectic' between doctrinal and local concepts of Orthodoxy (Stewart 1985b: 40)²³ into the more general dialectic between structure and strategy. Simplistic oppositions between local and official religion, or between instrumentality and spirituality, miss this dimension of a shared and contested universe of ideological discourse. In analysing the practice and ideology of oath-taking among animal-thieves, we have been able to see that the thieves' perspective challenges and reverses the ecclesiastical monopoly of ritual, but that it does so in a way that relocates ritual practice in real time. It provides a symbolic means for creating conditions under which mutual trust, theoretically impossible in the wicked, real world, can be restored. The pragmatic corollary of this symbolic construction is that shepherds can thereby limit the effectiveness of excuses based on notions of original sin and human baseness. That 'we are human (*anthropi*)' is a common justification for wrongdoing; but 'common humanity (*anthropia*)' is its very antithesis, being founded on the acceptance of some degree of moral responsibility for the effects of one's actions on others.

Strategy thus converts structural nostalgia into practice. It translates the aboriginal Word into a Babel of pragmatic 'words of honour' which stand for conflicting interests and motives. Trust works when reciprocal interest makes it work. This is the practical theodicy of self-acknowledged sinners. The interplay of values between the pastoral church and these frankly anti-clerical pastoralists is central to the cosmology—and to the imperfect *kosmos*—that they share.

NOTES

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¹ Significant historical connexions tie the rhetoric of Greek national identity to the theoretical dilemmas of modern anthropology (see Herzfeld 1987). More generally, the structural nostalgia that orthodox structuralism shares with so many of the world's cultures suggests that the attempt to distinguish the 'unconscious models' of the latter from the anthropologists' own analytical models (Lévi-Strauss 1963; cf. Herzfeld 1987: 60) may have been too ambitious, not to say ethnocentric.

² See Black-Michaud (1975) for a useful review of the definitional problems associated with the concept of feud, and of the attendant issues of duration and conclusion.

³ See Gellner (1988: 149) for an interesting analogue from an Islamic society and especially for Ibn Khaldun's anticipation of this type of argument.

⁴ On the conventions of animal-theft, see Herzfeld (1985: 163-231, especially pp. 183-9 on alliances). Spiritual kin, notably when the link is created through baptism rather than marriage, should not raid one another.

⁵ Standard Greek *ghrousonzia*, more literally 'being unlucky; banishing fortune'; see Herzfeld (1987: 178).

⁶ Shepherds prefer total indirection where possible. The victim's kinsman seeks *his* spiritual kinsmen in villages where he suspects that the theft originated; the latter leave him in their homes while they check with likely prospects among their own kin.

⁷ Campbell (1964: 344) adopts the same metaphor to describe the significance of family icons.

⁸ Being *Khrist(h)ianos* ('Christian') signifies social acceptability in a community of sinners, rather than devotion. Calling someone *Khristianos* may thus imply roguery rather than religiosity.

⁹ 'Eating', a common metaphor for theft, also implies the (dishonest) acquisition of wealth.

¹⁰ The Classical name of the court (Areopagos, hill of Ares) dates from the earliest years of the Greek State.

¹¹ Needham (1972) argues against describing 'psychological inner states' for entire peoples; Loizos (1975: 301, n. 2) extends this to secular conviction.

¹² *Pistemenos* (literally, 'believed') implies a *mutuality* of trust that the English 'persuaded' does not really capture. It may be taken as a tiny shred of evidence for the implied restoration of perfect balance that I have here called 'structural nostalgia'.

¹³ Cutting off these bells (*sklavéria*), which are distinctive to each animal and flock, graphically affronts the victim's masculinity. (See Herzfeld (1985: 191-2); Stewart (1987: 80-1).

¹⁴ Usually translated as 'dishonour', this term implies especially acts of sexual dishonesty or violence.

¹⁵ Bailey (1971: 17) similarly identifies 'concentric circles of trust' with Greek data from Campbell (1964). On segmentation as the key organising principle, see Herzfeld (1987: 173-9).

¹⁶ Theft of the ram, practically a threat to flock reproduction, is another symbolic emasculation of the shepherd (cf. n. 13, above).

¹⁷ On the theological foundations of gender ideology in Greece, see particularly du Boulay (1974: 100-20; 1986).

¹⁸ Deformation of conventional forms is basic to the 'poetics of social interaction' (Herzfeld 1985: 16).

¹⁹ In English and related languages, there is a complex etymological relationship between 'love' and 'belief'. At least two anthropologists have made use of this connexion, Needham (1972: 41-4) to suggest that these terms represent inaccessible psychological inner states, Hart (1988: 186-7) to connect the notion of trust to the 'evidence of the senses'. Whatever the consequences of either position, most recent writers (see, e.g. Gambetta 1988*b*) would accept that trust and its near-synonyms can only be analysed with confidence as *representations*. This, however, is no small or trivial undertaking.

²⁰ *Timi* also means 'price'. Despite problems about the supposed equivalence of *timi* and 'honour', the *loghos timis* does seem to have precisely the force of 'word of honour' in English.

²¹ For the corollary of the shepherd's role as divine, see Campbell (1964: 26).

²² The Classical and *koine* Greek is usually transliterated as *logos*. According to the conventions for transliterating modern Greek that I have adopted here, this word, spelled the same way in Greek, emerges as *loghos*; the respective plural forms are *logoi* and *loyi*. Cretan shepherds frequently emphasise a surprising piece of information with the exclamation *logho timis* ('[on my] word of honor').

²³ See also Stewart (1985*a*; 1987) for further, detailed explorations of this relationship.

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Orgueil et parjure: le temps et le serment dans les villages de montagne de Crète

Résumé

Les manipulations stratégiques des notions de confiance et de valeur éternelle invoquent un modèle éternel de réciprocité parfaite. Cette 'nostalgie structurelle' légitime les actions actuelles. Le principe est illustré par les usages de serments parmi les voleurs d'animaux crétois. Une fois qu'un serment a été prêté, les accusateurs ne peuvent exprimer leurs soupçons de parjure de la part des autres en l'absence de preuve irréfutable. La parole d'honneur est une réfraction du Mot divin, et des défis sans fondement offensent ainsi à la fois aux niveaux social et cosmologique. Le serment est utilisé pour établir la parité entre des rivaux, en rétablissant des relations sociales en une version proche de l'idéal. Son adoption par des cours de justice décroît sa fiabilité et son pouvoir moral en amoindissant davantage les principes de réciprocité sociale directe.